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In his terrific book, Crashed, Adam Tooze (2018a) narrates the shock of the 2007-8 financial 
crisis for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. He shows how a faulty policy 
framework led them not only to miss the oncoming crisis, but also then repeatedly 
misdiagnose the nature of the problem they were meant to address. We are still dealing with 
the profound aftershock of this cognitive dissonance. Since the crisis, central bankers have 
been experimenting with different ideas aimed at helping them come to terms with a financial 
system that has radically changed. 
Of particular importance is a new set of ideas that come under the heading of ‘macro-
finance’. The term reflects an ambition to renovate an antiquated macroeconomic policy 
framework and bring it up to date with an evolving economy that is increasingly shaped by 
global finance and the dominant transnational banks at its centre. One can read this shift to 
macro-finance as an attempt to financialise economic policy by moving away from the 
productivist framework of macroeconomics. In contrast to the latter, macro-finance proposes 
to feature financial activity more prominently in economic reasoning, policy analysis, and 
economic modelling (Cochrane, 2017; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2010). 
This involves two important changes to the traditional macroeconomic framework. The 
first is the adoption of a money view on finance that focuses on liquidity (Mehrling, 2010). 
Post-war economics, to the extent that it considered finance, was mainly concerned with the 
problem of solvency and whether loans would prove profitable or not. By contrast, recent 
discussions tied to macro-finance focus instead on liquidity. They revolve around the ability of 
financial agents to monetise their assets and get the money they need when payments are 
due. As Minsky (1977) highlighted, financial agents usually collapse because of their inability 
to make payments and meet their liabilities, rather than because they are insolvent. Liquidity 
should thus be taken as the more pressing issue for financial governance. Analytically, this 
money view often emphasises balance sheet analysis, which makes it easier to track the 
production of new monetary claims in highly meditated financial systems with overlapping 
clearing mechanisms. Politically, it has motivated calls for repurposing the infrastructure of 
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This emphasis on the ‘endogenous’ dynamics of finance requires more generally a 
second adjustment: shifting away from the national units of macroeconomics in favor of a 
transnational and global perspective on banking.1 The national emphasis of macroeconomics 
was a legacy of a distinct form of economic organisation that took shape in the late 
nineteenth  century. Yet the financial system is now dominated by 15-20 big banks that mostly 
operate at a transnational level. According to those championing macro-finance, the activities 
of these banks can only be understood with a global perspective on banking that transcends 
the limitations of national perspectives and their accounting templates. 
Reflecting on the broad ambitions of macro-finance, I argue here that the commitment to 
placing finance at the centre of our economic conceptions comes with significant risks that 
speak directly to the politics of financialisation. By redirecting the focus of economic 
governance towards finance, macro-finance may consolidate rather than challenge the 
problematic trends of global finance. More specifically, I argue that the focus of the money 
view on liquidity has contributed to depoliticising financial governance and aligning it further 
with the demands of financialisation. To bring power back into the picture, I propose to frame 
the analysis more tightly around a banking view of finance (rather than a money view), which 
puts emphasis on the leveraging practices of financial institutions rather than their liquidity 
constraints.2 While these two views are not exclusive, I make the case for why it makes a big 
difference to examine power as a product of leveraging rather than as a product of liquidity 
through the lens of a hierarchy of money. For it is the new capacities to raise liabilities that is 
key to the very story that Tooze so powerfully charts, rather than the more general concept of 
liquidity tied to the dealing of assets (or collateral). In what follows, I reflect on the parameters 
of macro-finance and the possibility of deriving a critical form of macro-finance by asking three 
questions meant to probe different aspects of this project.
What is new about financialisation?
The idea of macro-finance rests on the premise that there is something radically new about 
financialisation which forces us to change our analytical lenses. However, the defining feature 
of this new policy environment, or social context, remains underconceptualised in the 
literature on the subject. Part of the challenge is that, for all the in-depth analysis of the 
plumbing of finance, there are still few conceptual expositions of macro-finance as an 
approach, and those that do exist remain overly general. Tooze (2018b), for example, invokes 
general themes when presenting macro-finance that do not capture what is new about 
financialisation (the endogenous nature of money, the fact that the financial system is profit 
driven with procyclical tendencies, or that it is backed by state interventions). References to 
the hierarchy of money or the emphasis on liquidity may offer valid frameworks for analysis 
(although see below), but they remain evasive about the distinctive features of the current 
financial system that motivate macro-finance. 
It has not helped that the mainstream literature on macro-finance (Shin, 2012) has 
essentially replayed the globalisation debate of the 1990s (Castells, 2000; Held, 2000; Sholte, 
2005). Its critique of the national economy as a unit, its loose references to network analysis, 
and its emphasis on financial actors evading regulation all represent worn out lines of 
argumentation. The problem with globalisation theory was that it failed to yield rich social 
insights into globalisation because its focus on transnational flows made it difficult to keep 
sight of concrete and specified social contexts. Facing a wide array of practices coming from 
different parts of the world, with their diverse institutional and cultural settings, one quickly 
became paralyzed with complexity. With so many things to take into account, where would one 
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start? Hence, the problem was not necessarily that this approach had exaggerated the extent 
to which economic activity was globalising, but rather that in starting from this standpoint, it 
could not find a way to contextualise in meaningful ways the practices it sought to analyse 
(Knafo, 2018). This is why, more often than not, globalisation scholars ended up treating 
social context in generic ways and were forced to cast globalising trends as various processes 
of disembedding.  
Critical scholars of macro-finance have taken steps to avoid such a fate and help 
contextualise financial developments (Gabor, 2016). An emphasis on the Americanisation of 
finance, for example, is a useful specification (see Gabor, 2020). Yet scholars of macro-finance 
remain wedded to the generic framing of ‘market-based’ finance (or banking) as a way to 
capture this distinctive American approach to finance. This term encapsulates a wide array of 
practices and thus makes it difficult again to contextualise financialisation. While the term 
market-based finance may ‘fit’ the evidence, it does little to help us make decisions about 
what evidence to examine (Beck and Knafo, 2020). Considering that many of the ‘market’ 
practices we now associate with financialisation have a longer history (repo lending, 
securitisation, derivative instruments), then what exactly marks out recent developments in 
finance? Arguably, the current conceptual tools of macro-finance remain too blunt to navigate 
this tricky question. 
If macro-finance is going to be more than a fashionable label, we need to tighten the 
analytical lens. Along with Mareike Beck and Sahil Dutta, I have suggested that we turn 
instead to liability management as the distinctive feature of financialisation (Beck and Knafo, 
2020; see also Beck, 2019; Dutta, 2019). Building on a banking view of finance that frames 
the analysis by starting from the practices of banks (i.e. the most important financial actors), 
we have argued that it was a revolution in funding that took place in the late 1960s which 
completely transformed how banks leverage their operations. Through liability management, 
banks have relied extensively on money markets for funds, counting on other financial 
intermediaries rather than depositors for their funding. Tracking this transformation in the 
United States (US) and its complex effects, we argue, provides a richer standpoint from which 
to think about the specific features of this Americanisation of finance, and to specify the social 
context framing the analysis of financialisation. 
Should we be worried about the politics encoded into macro-finance?
The problem of specifying the perspective that critical macro-finance affords us is vital given 
the political implications of seeking to (rightly) challenge key parameters of macroeconomics. 
For all the accolades that are justifiably directed at Tooze, it is curious that critical scholars in 
the field of International Political Economy (IPE) have made so little of Tooze’s explicit debt to 
the economists of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary 
Fund, such as Tobias Adrian, Hyun-Song Shin, Claudio Borio, Piti Disyatat, and Richard 
McCauley. Should we not be more wary of embracing ideas that spring directly from 
intellectual networks tied to central banks? While the shift to macro-finance and 
macroprudential policy are certainly of great interest, there is a real risk in following central 
bankers that we end up normalising financialisation.
To be fair, IPE scholars have not gone down this path blindly, as reflected in the moniker 
of ‘critical’ macro-finance, which highlights how some scholars have been explicit about their 
desire to keep a distance from mainstream macro-finance (Gabor, 2020; Pape, 2020). In 
particular, there is a strong critique of attempts to re-legitimate the practices of securitisation 
and repo funding that figured so prominently in the last crisis (Braun, Gabor, and Hübner, 
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2018). But generally, Tooze and other scholars writing about macro-finance have remained 
ambiguous about their relationship to the BIS economists. More specifically, there is no critical 
discussion of mainstream macro-finance scholars that I can think of which spells out these 
differences. 
One of the particular outcomes of this silence is that there is considerable ambiguity over 
whether macro-finance refers to changes in governance or to a new analytical lens for 
analysing these changes. Is it an object of analysis or a framework for this analysis? The 
difference is important. As an object, or something we analyse, macro-finance represents a 
new project of governance pushed by central bankers and economists attached to central 
banks, notably through the BIS. As a framework, it represents a critical reflection on these 
transformations; a lens through which we can interpret them. While there is certainly much to 
learn from the excellent work of researchers such as Adrian, Shin, McCauley, or Borio, a critical 
macro-finance is only possible if we clearly take analytical distance from the former. 
What does this mean concretely? I want to highlight two different aspects of macro-
finance borrowed from the mainstream that have problematic implications for a critical 
perspective. The first is the priority that macro-finance has given to financial crises; a by-
product of its interest in the way assets lose liquidity in difficult times. What was once used to 
challenge the promotion of financial markets has now been turned into a justification for 
greater support of these same markets. With the macroprudential turn, the policy 
establishment has essentially normalised crisis as a recurrent aspect of the economy that 
needs to be managed. As a result, analyses of crisis now provide justifications for lubricating 
the workings of finance, rather than challenge what is being done through this financing. We 
know from experience that new institutional buffers which consolidate the financial system 
often make it easier for financiers to take even more risk, as reflected in the seemingly 
unavoidable problem of moral hazard (Vielma et al., 2019). By framing the analysis first and 
foremost as an attempt to avoid or manage crises, we thus risk playing into the hands of the 
financial and political establishment.
The second aspect I want to highlight is the emphasis of the money view on liquidity. As I 
mentioned, the work to re-centre economic analysis around finance has largely been done by 
promoting liquidity as a macro concept and framing device. This focus has helped better 
understand the dynamics of crisis and of course played a vital role in the rise of 
macroprudential policy. However, the concept of liquidity arguably frames our analysis in 
economic rather than political terms, because it pertains to the market quality of an asset 
rather than to the power relations it instantiates. In short, concerns with liquidity tend to focus 
on different modalities of the herd effect on financial markets when a loss of confidence leads 
to a rapid depreciation of assets and damages the balance sheets of financial actors. It directs 
our attention to mass movements on markets, rather than helping us identify power struggles 
between actors within these markets. The challenge of governance is then framed as a matter 
of ensuring a level of liquidity in the system, but too often this comes at the cost of a reflection 
on the way this leverage is used to anchor power relations.  
Whether a critical approach to macro-finance can find its footing when the problem is 
posed in these terms is questionable. For critical macro-finance to speak to the aspiration of a 
critical political economy, it must clarify its relationship to the more established intellectual 
positions of mainstream macro-finance. The point is not to reject dogmatically what are 
valuable contributions from this literature, but to recognise that its narrower concerns with 
stabilising the economy have resulted in real silences that need to be interrogated. In 
particular, it is important to realise that the concern with balance sheets and liquidity has too 
often led us to a money view that is more concerned with the balancing of financial activities 
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than with enquiring into the purposes of finance. For all the studies of the complex 
mechanisms of financing found here, there is a curious silence on what this financing is being 
used for. This leads us to the question of power.
Where are the power relations in macro-finance?
The limitations of mainstream macro-finance reflect something political economists have 
known for some time: economics is not very good at thinking about power. The challenge is 
particularly acute when it comes to finance because leveraging poses tricky analytical trade-
offs. Put simply: are highly leveraged financial agents powerful because of their ability to do a 
lot with limited capital, or weak because any change in the current market climate can bring 
them crashing down? The very flexibility afforded by finance is thus difficult to interpret since, 
by definition, it opens the door to a potentially greater moment of reckoning.
As Sahil Dutta (2017) argues, this duality in the nature of financial power has long 
troubled analysts and too often led them to see vulnerability where there is in fact great power 
(see also Sgambati, 2016). This was certainly the case with the high leveraging of banks 
before the subprime crisis, or indeed the great financial and monetary imbalances in the US 
since the 1980s (Hudson, 2003). It is common to interpret whatever defies our expectations 
about what is possible or ‘normal’ as a development that is unsustainable and thus bound to 
end. But this same quality can also be read as a sign of new capacities that have lent power to 
some agents now able to do something no one could do before them (Knafo, 2013).  
Confronted with this problem, the macro-finance literature has mostly followed in the 
footsteps of economics by casting leveraging agents as risky financiers which are vulnerable to 
a change in the financial climate. Following the idea of a hierarchy of money, running from 
well-established and easily monetisable assets to more specialised and less liquid 
instruments, this approach sees powerful agents as those who have prized assets in this 
system because of their liquidity (e.g. institutions that can issue highly liquid assets such as 
bank deposits). The result of this perspective is a curious inversion, where power remains tied 
to the production of high-powered money (cash, deposits, or short term government debt), 
when in fact the striking development of financialisation has been the ability of agents to gain 
great influence and leverage by operating at the lower echelons of the hierarchy of money, 
where they live off leveraging (e.g. private equity firms, hedge funds). Without denying the 
structural strength that agents such as banks can derive from their position in this hierarchy, 
the striking fact about financialisation is that dominant banks have shifted away from their 
role as creditors. What distinguishes the power they wield under financialisation is their 
newfound ability to leverage, not the fact that they issue money in the form of deposits. 
When privileging the angle of liquidity and crisis, mainstream macro-finance focuses our 
attention on the potential vulnerabilities of finance and what could happen in times of crisis, 
but this conceals the power wielded by finance in ‘normal times’. Prioritising the exceptional 
crisis over the normal working of finance thus directs our gaze away from the power relations 
that animate finance. The rise of private equity firms, subprime lenders, and hedge funds 
testifies to the growing power that leverage provides and its vital role in reshaping the global 
economy. That these agents have vulnerabilities is certainly true, but they are not simply a 
function of risk taking. They reflect the way some financial agents have been able to leverage 
their position in order to exert great power. A mainstream macro-finance approach, with its 
inverted perspective on the issue of power, is thus ill-equipped for a radical critique of finance 
and risks serving the interests of the powerful when thinking about sustainable leveraging, 
rather than enquiring into the purpose of leverage in the first place.3
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This highlights an important point that has been systematically downplayed by the money 
view informing macro-finance. For the issue is not simply that financial agents are leveraging 
in dangerous ways that threaten the delivery of financial services, but more importantly that 
the very nature of power and who is empowered through debt has changed in ways that 
challenge how we think of politics and governance. Taking macro-finance in a critical direction 
thus requires that we begin to focus on the politics of leveraging in a more systematic way 
(Sgambati, 2019).
Conclusion: Towards a critical macro-finance
Macro-finance has opened important new avenues for rethinking how we see the global 
economy and how we understand its politics. The calls for renovating macroeconomics so as 
to make space for finance, as well as the endogenous approach to finance, the insistence on 
the question of funding in the study of finance, and the reliance on balance sheets to track 
monetary claims and the complex entanglements of market-based banking have all 
contributed to setting out a promising research and political agenda for critical political 
economy. 
However, I maintain that the development of a critical macro-finance has been hindered 
by its reliance on a money view of finance. While useful to think about financial crises, it has 
made it difficult to bring the politics of financialisation into focus. Critical scholars should thus 
be careful not to adopt too readily the depoliticising lens of economists in their rightful 
eagerness to delve into the technicalities of finance. Finding ways to make the social context 
count, to avoid the functional concerns of macro-finance, and to conceive leverage as a source 
of power, rather than simply as a function of risk taking, is paramount for the project of 
developing a critical approach to macro-finance. This can be done, I have argued, by shifting 
from a money view to a banking view, which frames the analysis around a clear conception of 
what is new about banking under financialisation (i.e. liability management) and uses this to 
reframe our account of its politics.
Notes
1.    This policy framework was born in the early twentieth century out of the struggles to establish 
national economic systems of governance and placed an emphasis on the impact the balance of 
payment could have on currencies (Mitchell, 2008). It was an approach central to the era of 
Bretton Woods, when the main concern was to secure relatively recent national currencies (Knafo, 
2006).
2.    I follow in part the path pioneered by Stefano Sgambati (2016, 2019) in a series of articles 
highlighting the importance of banking practices and leveraging. Another author who has pursued 
a similar path is Carolyn Sissoko (2019), although her project is to reclaim the ideas of the 
nineteenth-century banking school. Still, she rightly highlights the importance of studying more 
specifically differences in banking practices and how they have reshaped global finance.
3.    This emphasis differs from Konings’ (2018) concept of leverage, which he uses as a twist on the 
notion of structural power. Konings examines leverage as a product of the way in which some 
agents can become part of the infrastructure upon which others depend. This then binds others to 
the fate of these agents, forcing them to work in order to improve the situations of the established 
financial agents. An example he uses is a ‘too big to fail’ bank that is propped up by government 
and other financial actors. By contrast, I am more interested in an agential conception of leverage, 
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focusing on the capacities built by banks through the new practices of liability management and 
how this has transformed what these banks are themselves able to do.   
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